The Case for Allowing  Convicted Mafiosi to Vote for Judges : Beyond Green v. Board of Elections of New York City by DuFresne, Elizabeth & DuFresne, William
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 19 
Issue 1 Fall 1969 Article 6 
The Case for Allowing "Convicted Mafiosi to Vote for Judges": 
Beyond Green v. Board of Elections of New York City 
Elizabeth DuFresne 
William DuFresne 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Elizabeth DuFresne & William DuFresne, The Case for Allowing "Convicted Mafiosi to Vote for Judges": 
Beyond Green v. Board of Elections of New York City, 19 DePaul L. Rev. 112 (1969) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol19/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
THE CASE FOR ALLOWING "CONVICTED MAFIOSI TO
VOTE FOR JUDGES": BEYOND GREEN V. BOARD
OF ELECTIONS OF NEW YORK CITY
ELIZABETH AND WILLIAM DU FRESNE*t
HEN Green v. Board of Electors of New York City, 380 F.2d
445 (2d Cir. 1967) was denied certiorari, 389 U.S. 1048
(1968), there was great concern expressed by civil libertar-
ians as to the impact this would have on judicial consideration of the
various rights of which a convicted felon is deprived. The Green case
was limited, as is the present inquiry, to the right to vote. The court
stated therein that our system did not and could not countenance
"convicted Mafiosi. . .(voting for) . . .judges. . ... The prem-
ise of this article is the antithesis of the Green position: Not only is the
American system so constructed that the vote of the convicted felon
is equal to that of any other citizen in weight, but the convicted felon's
vote is worthy of unusually stringent constitutional protections because
in the past there has been a pattern of discrimination against him from
the very legislators for whom he is not allowed to vote.
The constitutional arguments below are double-pronged: Initially
the concept of "fencing out" felons from the election process is exam-
ined; then, in the alternative, due process and equal protection are
applied to the present system by which some felons are restored to
civil rights, while the vast majority are not.
* MRS. DU FRESNE received her B.A. from Vanderbilt University and her J.D.
from the University of Florida. She is a member of the Florida Bar and is cur-
rently an attorney for the Economic Opportunity Legal Services Program of Dade
County, Miami, Florida.
t MR. Du FRESNE received his B.A. from the University of Omaha and his J.D.
from the University of Florida. He is a member of the Florida Bar and is currently
an attorney for the Economic Opportunity Legal Services Program of Dade County,
Miami, Florida.
MR. AND MRS. Du FRESNE have co-outhored several other lead articles and were
attorneys for Plaintiff in Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Fla. 1969),
appeal dismissed by the United States Supreme Court October 21, 1969, an unsuccess-
ful attempt to prove a convicted felon's right to vote.
1. Green v. Bd. of Electors of New York City, 380 F.2d 445, 451-52 (2d Cir.
1967).
112
ALLOWING "CONVICTED MAFIOSI TO VOTE"
STATUTES WHICH AUTOMATICALLY AND INDEFINITELY DISFRANCHISE
ALL CONVICTED FELONS, REGARDLESS OF THEIR CRIME,
ARE, ON THEIR FACE, UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The word "felony" is taken from a Latin word meaning "venom-
ous" or "poisonous."2 This definition is consistent with its use in the
European feudal system, which was to designate a breach of feudal
obligations of a sufficiently serious nature to warrant forfeiture of
all properties in addition to capital or corporal punishment.3 In
English common law, the term felony was applied to such major
breanches of the King's peace as homicide, arson, rape and robbery.'
Quite obviously, under the early treatment of felons, the depri-
vation of the right to vote did not emerge as a particularly stringent
forfeiture. Even relatively late in the history of the term "felon,"
one sees that in nineteenth century America less than ten per cent
of the population were qualified to vote. Sex, color, property hold-
ings, payment of taxes, past servitude, and conviction of "infamous
crimes" were all considered legitimate limitations on the "privilege"
of suffrage.' Disqualification of a certain class of criminals ap-
peared quite acceptable in light of the times. Felonious behavior is the
only one of the above named restrictions on voting still with us.'
However, to the layman, the semantical associations of the word
"felon" are still so vile that such an individual seems "unworthy" of
the vote.7
For an illustration of the latitude which the states assumed in fixing
voter qualifications, even after the passage of the Civil War Amend-
ments, one need only read the following passage from Ratliff v.
Beale:
If we look at the map of the state, and at the census reports, showing the racial
distribution of our population, and consider these in connection with the apportion-
2. 2 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 357 (1923).
3. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 95 (4th ed. 1769).
4. Supra note 2, at 358. See Note, Civil Disabilities of Felons, 53 VA. L. REV.
403, 406-08 (1967) for a discussion of the history of the term "felony."
5. STOREY, OUR UNALIENABLE RIGHTS 47 (1965).
6. See 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 148, 155 (1967); MCGOVNEY, THE AMERICAN SUF-
FRAGE MEDLEY 1-17 (1949).
7. See WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 931 (1963) for definition of
"felon": "Cruel; murderous; wild; malignant; fierce; traitorous; disloyal .... "
1969]
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIX:112
ment of the constitution, it will at once appear that, unless there shall be a great
shifting of population, the control of the legislative department of the state is so fixed
in the counties having majorities of whites as to render exceedingly improbable
that it can be changed in the near future by the ordinary flow of immigration, or
by the growth by births among our own people. The election of the chief executive
of the state is also largely affected by the same means. It is in the highest degree
improbable that there was not a consistent, controlling directing purpose governing
the convention by which these schemes were elaborated and fixed in the constitution.
Within the field of permissible action under the limitations imposed by the federal
constitution, the convention swept the circle of expedients to obstruct the exercise of
the franchise by the negro race. By reason of its previous condition of servitude
and dependence, this race had acquired or accentuated certain peculiarities of habit,
of temperament, and of character, which clearly distinguished it as a race from that
of the whites,-a patient, docile people, but careless, landless, and migratory
within narrow limits, without forethought, and its criminal members given rather
to furtive offenses than to the robust crimes of the whites. Restrained by the fed-
eral constitution from discriminating against the negro race, the convention dis-
criminated against its characteristics and the offenses to which its weaker members
were prone. A voter who should move out of his election precinct, though only to
an adjoining farm, was declared ineligible until his new residence should have con-
tinued for a year. Payment of taxes for two years at or before a date fixed many
months anterior to an election is another requirement and one well calculated to
disqualify the careless. Burglary, theft, arson, and obtaining money under false
pretenses were declared to be disqualifications, while robbery and murder and other
crimes in which violence was the principal ingredient were not.8
Surely such blatant racially discriminatory voter qualifications are
now recognized to be beyond the realm of state control.' The fran-
chise has been greatly expanded in the twentieth century-to those
few still denied the right to vote, the Constitution assures strict scru-
tiny to whatever compelling state interest is put forth as justifying
the sanction.' °
THOSE WITHOUT CIVIL RIGHTS STILL HAVE BASIC
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
Before proceeding to the merits of the ex-felons' claim to the right
to vote, it should be determined whether their status of being without
"civil rights" puts ex-felons beyond the protection of the Constitution.
The answer to that is a resounding "No"-or stated affirmatively,
the equal protection and due process clauses apply to every citizen
and cannot be taken away by a state government.
8. 74 Miss. 247, 266-67, 20 So. 865, 868 (1896) (emphasis added). This was
later quoted with approval in Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 222 (1898).
9. See pages 115-19, infra.
10. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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Although it is true that "[1]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal
or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations
underlying our penal system," . . . it is well established that prisoners do not lose
all their constitutional rights and that the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment follow them into prison and protect them
there from unconstitutional action on the part of prison authorities carried out un-
der color of state law.1 1
THE CONSTITUTION IS A LIVING INSTRUMENT
As Mr. Justice Holmes said nearly fifty years ago:
[WI hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Consti-
tution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being
the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most
gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had
created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much
sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be
considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was
said a hundred years ago.' 2
Today the significance of Justice Holmes' words are apparent when
one considers Davis v. Beason,1" and Murphy v. Ramsey. 14  Al-
though these cases were originally limited to the Mormon polygamy
issue, the United States Supreme Court recently cited them as indi-
cating that a state may constitutionally disfranchise persons who have
committed any crime. 5 If the Constitution is a static creature, the
arguments of this section of the article are misplaced. However, over
and over again, the courts have underscored the dramatic develop-
ing quality of the Constitution:
The Constitution of the United States must be read as embodying general princi-
ples meant to govern society and the institutions of government as they evolve
through time. It is therefore this court's function to apply the Constitution as a
living document to the legal cases and controversies of contemporary society.16
11. Washington v. Lee, 363 F. Supp. 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1966), (3 judge court)
(action for declaratory relief from racial segregation in state penal system and
county, city and town jails-granted). See also Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529
(5th Cir. 1968); Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967); Talley v.
Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
12. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
13. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
14. 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
15. These cases have also been used by the Court to support dicta on the
states' primary responsibility in settling voter qualifications. This support is hard
to justify, since both cases involved an Act of Congress, rather than an instance of
state prerogative.
16. White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401, 408 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (3 judge court).
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Noting the evolution of the Constitution since Davis and Murphy,
one is singularly struck by the fact that when those cases were de-
cided the fourteenth amendment was not used to invalidate state
voting qualifications-indeed, it was not until the last decade's ap-
portionment and voting rights cases that such a practice gained ac-
ceptance.
17
Probably the best known case which turned on the modern de-
velopment of increased social and ethical awareness in society is
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka.' In Brown the Court
found that the legislative history of the equal protection clause as
applied to segregated public schools was "inconclusive."'"
Less publicized than Brown, but even more relevant to the present
inquiry, are Baker v. Carr21 and Harper v. Virginia Board of Elec-
tors.21  In these cases, as well as in Carrington v. Rash,2 the four-
teenth amendment was applied to the right to vote! Thus, earlier
cases which did not consider the fourteenth amendment's application
to voting rights are of limited significance to current inquiries. 3
THE RIGHT TO VOTE AS IT WAS DEVELOPED IN THIS DECADE
It would seem self-evident that democracy and the unabridged right to vote are one
and the same. Yet, surprisingly enough, it has taken this country almost 200
years of struggle against tradition and custom to realize the basic doctrine of "one
citizen, one vote." 1IT]he only criterion for being able to vote is to be a citizen.
And all citizens are to be equally represented. As James Madison said in the
Federalist, No. 57:
"Who are the electors of the Federal representatives? Not the rich more than the
poor; not the learned more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distin-
guished names more than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune.
The electors are to be the great body of the people of the United States."
What Madison said so clearly 200 years ago has only slowly been realized, through
17. Note, The Equal Protection Clause as a Limitation on the State's Power to
Disfranchise Those Convicted of a Crime, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 299, 316-18 (1967).
See Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 249 (1966) (Douglas, Brennan, & Fortas, JJ.
and Warren, C.J., dissenting).
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. Id. at 489. The decision in Brown was postponed for a year to permit
full argument of the historical background of the fourteenth amendment. RUTGERS
L. REV., supra note 17, at 307 n.73.
20. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
21. Supra note 10.
22. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
23. See RUTGERS L. REV., supra note 17, at 305, 307.
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four constitutional amendments, numerous Supreme Court decisions, and much leg-
islation, giving the idea the reality of law. In the beginning, the only person uni-
formly assured of the right to vote was the white, 21-year-old male, propertied, lit-
erate, a fixed resident, and with means to pay any tax. Gradually these restrictions
have fallen by the wayside, as custom and prejudice gave way to reason, or the
coercion of law. Most recently, through the 24th amendment, the poll tax has been
driven from the list of subtle discriminations against the full exercise of the voting
right. 24
In the above-quoted speech, the Congressman mentions the "nu-
merous Supreme Court decisions" on the right to vote-almost all of
which have occurred since 1960. "[I]n particular during the last
decade-the right to vote has received greater recognition by the
courts .... "25
Of course, this is not to say that the right to vote did not receive
any attention until modern times. An early example of the Court's
concern in the area is Yick Wo v. Hopkins in which it was said that
the exercise of the franchise is "a fundamental political right because
[it is] preservative of all rights. 26  Other courts, too, have invali-
dated processes such as pre-primary elections by white Democrats
which were patently racial and designed to keep Negroes from
voting. However, it remained for the "Warren Court" to expand
the constitutional conception of a fundamental right to vote which
was part of the heritage of every citizen.
Summarizing the recent decisions in the field is United States v.
Texas:27
To determine whether a right is protected by the due process clause, a court "must
look to the 'traditions and [collective] conscience of our people' to determine
whether a principle is 'so rooted [there] ... as to be ranked as fundamental.'
Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 . . . . The inquiry is
whether a right involved 'is of such a character that it cannot be denied without
violating those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base
of our civil and political institutions" . . . Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S.
47, 67 .... '
When measured against these standards and examined in the light of Supreme Court
pronouncements describing it as our most "precious" right, Wesberry v. Sanders, 1964,
376 U.S. 1, 17 ...and as the "essence of a democratic society." Reynolds v. Sims,
24. 114 CONG. REC. 8077 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1968) (remarks of Representative
Schwengel) (emphasis added).
25. United States v. Alabama, 252 F. Supp. 95, 105 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (3 judge
court) (Johnson, J., "specially" concurring).
26. 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
27. 252 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Tex. 1966) (3 judge court), af'd., 384 U.S. 155
(1966).
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1964, 377 U.S. 533, 555 . . . it cannot be doubted that the right to vote is one of the
fundamental personal rights included within the concept of liberty as protected by the
due process clause.28
"The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be
obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic,
is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system." Stromberg v. People of
State of California, 1931, 283 U.S. 359, 369 . . . . Yet how ineffective is this
'political discussion' protected by the First Amendment if its ultimate objective can
be denied at the ballot box.
Even though not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, the right to vote clearly
constitutes one of the most basic elements of our freedom-the "core of our con-
stitutional system." Carrington v. Rash, 1965, 380 U.S. 89, 96 ....
"No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the
election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.
Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.
Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way that un-
necessarily abridges this right.]" Wesberry v. Sanders, 1964, 376 U.S. 1, 17 ....
See Harmon v. Forssenius, 1965, 380 U. S. 528 . . . ; Carrington v. Rash, supra;
Reynolds v. Sims, 1964, 377 U.S. 533 . . . . It would be ironic indeed if the Con-
stitution did not protect the right to vote, since that right was long acknowledged to
be "preservative of all rights." 29
Any further question as to whether suffrage is a fundamental right
is answered by Reynolds v. Sims.s0  In the Reynolds opinion,
Chief Justice Warren, on behalf of six members of the Court, asserted
the "undeniable" protection of the Constitution of the United States
for the right of all qualified citizens to vote in state as well as federal
elections. The majority opinion dwells on the continuing expansion
of the scope of the right of suffrage in this century. Relevant to
that expansion, the Court mentioned the seventeenth, nineteenth,
twenty-third and twenty-fourth amendments to the federal Constitu-
tion and the recent civil rights legislation enacted by Congress.3 ' As
the Court emphasized, the "fundamental" quality of the right of suf-
frage in a free and democratic society, it explicitly required that any
"alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be care-
fully and meticulously scrutinized." '
A final eloquent statement of the "right's" position at the heart of
28. Id. at 250. (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 249-50.
30. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
31. Id. at 554-55.
32. Id. at 561-62.
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the Constitution, is found in the dissent in Fortson v. Morris."a
Therein, "the basic instrument of democracy-the vote"-is dis-
cussed: "A vote is not an object of art. It is the sacred and most
important instrument of democracy. .. .
A STATE MAY SET VOTER'S QUALIFICATIONS ONLY SO FAR AS SUCH
QUALIFICATIONS MEET CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
As long ago as 1884, the constitutional limitations upon the states'
ability to establish voters' qualifications were acknowledged in Ex
parte Yarbrough. 5  In Yarbrough, the Court held that the fifteenth
amendment "clearly shows that the right of suffrage was considered
to be of supreme importance to the national government and was
not intended to be left within the exclusive control of the states."3
There is no realm of action in which a state legislature is free to
ignore the requirements of the federal Constitution, and when a
state acts in violation of the terms of the Constitution, it is the duty
of the federal courts to so declare.3 7 A very recent Supreme Court
decision is Williams v. Rhodes, 8 which was concerned with an Ohio
election law that made it impossible for a new political party 9 to
be listed on the ballot. In that case, the Court said that they must
obviously reject the notion that article II, §1 of the Constitution
could give the states the power to impose a burden on the right to
vote when "such burdens are expressly prohibited in other constitu-
tional provisions. '40  The Court held that a state could not pass a
law which purported to regulate elections if that law did not meet the
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause.
Similarly, in Katzenbach v. Morgan,4 which successfully at-
tacked New York's English literacy requirements for voting, the
Court spoke of the state-federal involvement in qualifying voters.
33. 385 U.S. 231, 249 (1966).
34. Id. at 250.
35. 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
36. Id. at 664.
37. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
38. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
39. In that case the party was the American Independent Party of candidate
George Wallace.
40. Supra note 38, at 10.
41. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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Although the Court recognized that, under the distribution of powers,
the states may establish the voting qualifications which in turn deter-
mine who may vote in federal elections, the Court also underscored
the fact that the states have absolutely no power to grant or withhold
the franchise on conditions which are forbidden by either the four-
teenth amendment or any provision of the Constitution. Such an
exercise of state authority would amount to state action and would
be constitutionally cognizable.
Although there is no need to belabor this issue, it is important to
cover because the states have contended that voting rights cases in-
vade rights reserved to the states under the tenth amendment.42 In
support of this contention, reference has been made to Minor v.
Happersett,3 in which the Court stated that "the Constitution of the
United States does not confer the right of suffrage upon anyone
. . . ,"4 and United States v. Anthony,4" in which the Court said
that the right or privilege of voting was dependent upon state citizen-
ship, rather than national, and that the state might constitutionally
provide "that no person should vote until he had reached the age
of thirty years, or after he had reached the age of fifty, or that no
person having gray hair, or who had not the use of all his limbs,
should be entitled to vote . . .... ' It is plain that today these cases
would be decided quite differently.
STATE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS WHICH DEPRIVE
FELONS OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE INDEFINITELY, REGARDLESS OF
THEIR CRIME, OFFEND THE EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE
PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Once the right to vote has been characterized as a "fundamental
right,' 47 the fourteenth amendment tests for invasions of that right
become more stringent. The so-called "preferred rights" analysis of
testing voting qualifications requires a "compelling state interest,"
42. E.g., United States v. Manning, 215 F. Supp. 272 (W.D. La. 1963) (3
judge court).
43. 88 U.S. 162 (1874).
44. Id. at 178.
45. 24 F. Cas. 829 (No. 14459) (C.C.N.C. N.Y. 1873).
46. Id. at 830. See also cases cited in RUTGERS L. REv., supra note 17, at 302
n.24.
47. See supra pp. 116-19 of this article.
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and legislation which is drafted with "narrow specificity," that is,
regulation which is "carefully confined."48  Within the framework of
the overall fourteenth amendment testing, the Equal Protection
Clause basically demands that statutory classifications be reasonable
(lacking arbitrariness, discrimination and "over inclusiveness")"
while substantive due process calls for a rational relationship between
the statute and a legitimate legislative purpose.,'
Were the Disfranchising Provisions Enacted Pursuant to a Legitimate
Legislative Purpose? Are they Reasonable in Light of Such
Purpose?
In Ratliff v. Beale,51 the Court felt that the Mississippi state
constitutional convention had diligently sought-and found by,
amongst other things, disfranchising persons for "Negro-type" crimes
-a method of legislating against the bad characteristics of the slave
race. 2 The Florida courts, however, saw such disfranchisement as a
continuing "punishment. "53 It seems extremely unlikely that either
of these stated purposes would today be recognized as "legitimate
legislative purposes." If states should choose to support a "punish-
ment" or "racial" theory, rather than some more sophisticated ration-
ale, their position would be indefensible.
For example, if punishment were put forth as the reasonable basis
of the deprivation of the vote, one could look to Trop v. Dulles.4
There Chief Justice Warren used the deprivation of the felon's right to
vote as an example of a nonpenal regulation.15 It was evident from
the context of the illustration that had the regulation been for the pur-
pose of punishment it would most probably be invalid as cruel and
unusual punishment." And, since one who has been convicted of a
48. Supra note 10, at 670; See Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 414 P.2d 412
(1966).
49. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 189-91 (1964); Carrington v.
Rash, supra note 22.
50. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Schware v. Board of Bar Exami-
ners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
51. Supra note 8.
52. Supra note 8, at 868.
53. Singleton v. State, 38 Fla. 297, 302, 21 So. 21, 23 (1896).
54. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
55. Id. at 96.
56. Id. at 100-03. Accord, Otsuka v. Hite, supra note 48.
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federal felony under, for instance, the Narcotics Act, comes within
the scope of these provisions, the state's action would amount to a
state punishment for a prior federal offense.
Assuming then that the states will reject the "punishment" phil-
osophy under which most of the statutes originally came into being,
what other purpose can justify the deprivation of the vote to an en-
tire class of persons? The purpose which has most frequently found
endorsement under the law was that such action is necessary to pre-
serve the "purity of the ballot box. '57
The protection of the "purity of the ballot box," or of the "in-
tegrity of the elective process"" is a more tenable expression of the
state interest and is the most widely used statement"9 of that interest.
The inquiry is not ended here. The mere assertion of a present-
able state rationale is not constitutionally sufficient. As stated by
the Supreme Court:
[F]undamental personal liberties . . . may not be abridged by the States simply on
a showing that a regulatory statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation
of a proper state purpose.00
Under the stringent requirements of these constitutional standards, none of the
suggested justifications may be sustained. Purification and protection of the ballot
may be accomplished by other means as the State of Texas has recognized by the
passage of numerous penal provisions. 61
The question has now become not whether some purpose for the
law could conceivably exist, but, more importantly, whether the chal-
lenged laws are necessary in light of the stated purpose. But, if the
states proffer the "purity of the ballot box" arguments, an inquiry
57. See Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585, 51 Am. R. 479, 481 (1884):
"The manifest purpose is to preserve the purity of the ballot box, which is the only
sure foundation of republican liberty, and which needs protection against the inva-
sion of corruption, just as much as that of ignorance, incapacity or tyranny . ...
The presumption is, that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or other
base offense indicative of great moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of
suffrage, or to hold office, upon terms of equality with freemen who are clothed
by the State with the toga of political citizenship. It is proper, therefore, that this
class should be denied a right, the exercise of which might sometimes hazard the
welfare of communities, if not that of the State itself, at least in close political
contests."
58. In the words of Otsuka, supra note 48, at 611, 414 P.2d at 418.
59. RUTGERs L. REv., supra note 17, at 311.
60. United States v. Texas, supra note 27, at 251.
61. United States v. Texas, supra note 27, at 251. Footnote 71, p. 251, lists 17
explicit statutory methods for controlling election corruption.
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such as that suggested above by United States v. Texas62 would de-
feat the state's contention. For example, the Election Code of the
State of Florida,6" sets forth 35 punishable election offenses-from
buying votes to tampering with a voting machine, and the Florida
Statutes set out an additional offense or two related to bribery of
candidates and election officers.64 Yet, the state still feels it
must not allow convicted felons to vote. 5 Surely, the Florida Stat-
utes offer all the machinery necessary to protect the electoral system
from corruption. If they do not, then supplemental laws should be
passed dealing with specific offenses.
If the "purity of the ballot box" logic means more than is en-
compassed by corrupt election practices, it can only mean that the vote
of a convicted felon is somehow impure in and of itself.66 This cannot
be!
In Carrington, the Supreme Court considered a state constitutional
provision which made it impossible for any member of the Armed
Forces to establish residency for the purpose of voting. The citizens
of Texas were afraid of the effect of the military vote.
But if they are in fact residents, with the intention of making Texas their home
indefinitely, they, as all other qualified residents, have a right to an equal oppor-
tunity for political representation..... "Fencing out" from the franchise a sector of
the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.
"[T]he exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions,"
• . . cannot constitutionally be obliterated because of a fear of the political views of
a particular group of bona fide residents.6
In these times of a constantly expanding franchise, the possibility of
the "criminal element" controlling a town through the ballot is an
imaginary horrible. But even if the fear were well-founded, Carring-
ton leaves no room to doubt that a man cannot be deprived of his
right to vote because of how he may cast his vote.
The unreasonableness of using such a drastic remedy cannot be
overemphasized. If a classification must be reasonable in light of
the classifying law's purpose, " consider the class of "felons" and that
62. Id.
63. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 104.01-104.46 (1960).
64. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 838.01, 838.10 (1965).
65. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.041(5) (1960).
66. Green v. Board of Elections of City of New York, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968).
67. Supra note 22, at 94 (emphasis added).
68. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 189-91 (1946).
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class's deprivations relative to the result desired by the purpose of
disfranchising statutes.
As a threshold matter, it should be determined who are "felons"
under state law. For example, many states have provisions similar
to this one:
The term felony, ... whenever it may occur in this Constitution or in the laws of
the State, shall be construed to mean any criminal offense punishable with death
or imprisonment in the State Penitentiary.0 9
In other words, if two persons commit crimes that are each punish-
able with one year's imprisonment, but one is convicted under a stat-
ute which assigns the violator to the state penitentiary and the other
under a statute which specifies the county jail or does not specify the
place of imprisonment-the first is a felon and the second a mere
perpetrator of a misdemeanor. The first is disfranchised, the sec-
ond is not. There is hardly a reasonable distinction between the two
classes.
Although such a tactic may develop into a game, there is some
value in studying the criminal statutes in search of a common bond
that would render all felons likely to "corrupt" the elective sys-
tem and would absolve all misdemeanants from such tendency. Un-
fortunately no such logical pattern evolves. In fact, little or no
formulae can be seen for determining which misconduct will be
deemed a felony and which will be a misdemeanor. The only clear
pattern is the designation of conduct which harms powerful economic
groups such as farmers as felonies-and even that pattern is not pris-
tine.
Only a few illustrations are necessary to show the arbitrariness of
the classification based on punishment, rather than the nature of the
crime. Because our practice is in Florida, the examples are taken
from that State's laws, however, every state statute book can readily
provide illustrations of the capriciousness of the categories. For
example: one who falsely reports a bombing is a felon,"0 but one
who gives false alarms for a fire7 is a misdemeanant. Unmarried
persons who cohabit lewdly and lasciviously 2 are felons, but married
69. FLA. CONST., art. XVI, § 25.
70. FLA. STAT. § 790.163 (1965).
71. FLA. STAT. § 823.03 (1965).
72. FLA. STAT. § 798.02 (1965).
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persons who fornicate have only committed a misdemeanor.73 One
who injures a milldam or machinery of a water mill or cotton gin 74
is a felon while the much more serious crime, in terms of community
rather than economic values, of injuring a dwelling house, school
house, or church education building is only a misdemeanor.7 5 Ma-
liciously killing an animal of another 70 is a felony and the negligent
deprival of human children of necessary food, clothing or shelter 77 is
a misdemeanor. Stealing a hog78 is a felony, but stealing and/or
harming a dog 79 is a misdemeanor.
Quite obviously the difference between the man who steals a hog
and one who steals a dog is an unreasonable basis for depriving one
of the vote and not the other."'
The authors' contention is not that there are misdemeanors which
should carry disfranchisement, but that the class of felonies is an
arbitrary class. There is simply no rational relationship between
most felonies and the exercise of the franchise. Does the person
who lives in open adultery contaminate the voting process more than
the thousands of voters that the sociologists tell us live in secret
adultery? The answer is that neither offends the purity of the ballot
box unless that person is also a briber of election officials, a buyer
of votes, or some other category of election offender. These manifes-
tations of corruption may be dealt with under alternative systems
which do not indiscriminately take the vote from persons who are no
more prone to election misconduct than the average voter.
73. FLA. STAT. § 798.03 (1965).
74. FLA. STAT. § 822.06 (1965).
75. FLA. STAT. § 822.04 (1965).
76. FLA. STAT. § 828.07 (1965).
77. FLA. STAT. § 828.04 (1965).
78. FLA. STAT. § 811.14 (1965).
79. FLA. STAT. § 811.19 (1965).
80. There are many misdemeanors which are much more nearly related to
the ability to participate in elections without having a corrupting effect than are the
majority of felonies. For example, a person who participates in an unauthorized
military organization [FLA. STAT. § 870.06 (1965)], one who wantonly, wilfully
or maliciously mars, defaces, injures or mutilates the State Capitol or other public,
religious, civic or charitable buildings [FLA. STAT. § 822.03 (1965)] and one who
wears a hood and plants burning crosses [FLA. STAT. §§ 876.12-876.21 (1965)],
commits a misdemeanor and suffers no loss of franchise. The irrationality of sep-
arating such offenses from other, far less significant offenses, on the strength of
the place of possible confinement is apparent.
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"There is no such thing as states legitimately being just a little bit
discriminatory. ' '81  In a state's classification of felons as those to be
deprived of the vote, there is no reasonable relationship between
the offense and any possible purpose of disfranchising. Thus the
Equal Protection Clause is violated. 82
The Equal Protection Clause requires more of a state law than nondiscriminatory
application within the class it establishes. . . . It also imposes a requirement of
some rationality in the nature of the class singled out. . . . [T]he Equal Protec-
tion Clause does require that, in defining a class subject to legislation, the distinc-
tions that are drawn have "some relevance to the purpose for which classification
is made."8 33
The irrationality of such legislation in many states is perfectly
highlighted by a consideration of how the matter is handled in other
states. Have all states found it necessary to "protect the ballot" by
an across-the-board disfranchisement of all convicted felons? If not,
is that fact not illustrative of the availability of other methods of
giving the election process protection without taking away some cit-
izens' most fundamental entr6 into representative government?
Upon completion of sentence, the right to vote is automatically re-
stored in Kansas, 4 Ohio," Michigan,8" Indiana, 87 Wisconsin 8
Colorado," and West Virginia.'.. There is no disqualification in
Maine and only a very limited one in Vermont."1 In Missouri, 2
Tennessee," and California,94 the right to vote is automatically re-
stored after a given period of time following release for all crimes
81. Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Commission, 275 F. Supp. 833
(E.D. La. 1967) (3 judge court), aff'd, 389 U.S. 571 (1968).
82. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
498 (1954).
83. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1966) (emphasis added).
84. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62.2252 (1964).
85. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2965.17 (1954).
86. MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 6.1492, 6.1938 (1956). The MICH. CONST., art. 2,
§ 2, would allow the legislature to disqualify those convicted of crime from voting
but the legislature has not chosen to do so.
87. IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-3409 (1969).
88. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 57.078 (1957), except for crime of bribery, Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 6.03(1) (1957).
89. COLO. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
90. W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
91. Relating to crimes of fraud and lasting only five years.
92. Mo. REV. STAT. § 216.355 (1959).
93. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40.371 (1955).
94. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.4 (Supp. 1966).
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except treason. Pennsylvania's voting restriction only applies to
those who have violated election laws and even then is limited to a
period of four years. 5  Massachusetts"6 and New Hampshire 7 sim-
ilarly restrict the franchise to those who have committed an "election
crime." Utah's disqualifying provision is similar but includes treason
as well as "crimes against the elective franchise. '98
If these sixteen states (and perhaps others since the listing above
does not attempt to be exhaustive) have been able to keep their
ballots "pure" without an open-ended disfranchisement of all felons,
it seems that the state constitutional and statutory provisions which
purport to take from all felons the right to vote are unreasonable,
arbitrary, and discriminatory to those persons who are being unneces-
sarily deprived of suffrage without a "compelling state interest."
"Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way
that unnecessarily abridges this right [speaking of the right to vote]. ' 9"
The Challenged Practices are Over-Broad or Over-Inclusive in
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The Supreme Court has held that state-imposed limitations on the
right to exercise suffrage are valid only if there is a showing of a
"compelling state interest." It further instructs that such restrictions
must be drawn with "narrow specificity" and must be germane to
the "intelligent exercise of the franchise."' 0
There is nothing suggesting "narrow specificity" about the disquali-
fication from suffrage of anyone who has been convicted of a felony.
Some states base the term felony on the place of punishment, while
others make the definition dependent upon the length of sentence.
The arbitrariness of the class of "felons" has already been suggested.
The only acceptable criterion appears to be the nature of the crime.'0 1
The California Supreme Court, in a decision which held the class of
95. PA. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
96. MASS. CONST. amend. XL.
97. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6913 (Supp. 1965).
98. UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6.
99. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964).
100. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, supra note 10. See also Fort v. Civil
Service Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331, 337, 392 P.2d 385, 389 (1964); Comment, Otsuka
v. Hite (Cal 1966), 4 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 190, at 192-93 (1967).
101. As suggested by supra note 17.
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"felons" to be an invalid one for the purpose of protecting the electoral
system, said:
[D]efendant's proposed construction of "infamous crime" to include any and all
felonies would . . . sweep into its ambit malum prohibitum conduct which is but
little detrimental to society at large and is totally unrelated to the goal of preserva-
tion of the integrity of the elective process. 0 2
Rather, the inquiry must focus more precisely on the nature of the crime itself, and
determine whether the elements of the crime are such that he who has committed
it may reasonably be deemed to constitute a threat to the integrity of the elective
process.103
Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of the State of New
York,"' a case in which New York's loyalty statute which allowed
dismissal of public school teachers for "treasonable" and "seditious"
acts was held invalid, reiterated that:
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that pur-
pose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved.10 5
Keyishian also reemphasized that: "precision of regulation must be
the touchstone in an area so clearly touching our most precious
freedoms."'10a
It has been suggested above that the desired end might be accom-
plished through penal statutes specifically directed toward election
misconduct. However, if this is not felt to be sufficient, the category
of persons barred from voting may certainly be made more specific
than those who have committed a "felony." Voting restrictions must
be "germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral
process, ' 1°7 and to keep the election machinery free from actual
fraudulent acts. Thus, "election crimes" might well be a suffi-
ciently specific category to accomplish the purpose of the legislation.
And even after so limiting the class, the quality of indefiniteness in
102. Otsuka v. Hite, supra note 48, at 606, 414 P.2d at 419.
103. Otsuka v. Hite, supra note 48, at 611, 414 P.2d at 422. Cf. State v. Lam-
boon, 107 S.C. 275, 277, 92 S.E. 622, 623 (1917): "[i~t is not a fact that the na-
ture of all felonies is such as to make it probably that the parties committing them
are devoid of truth and insensible to the obligations of an oath. The name by which
an offense is designated does not change its moral characteristics which must
necessarily be considered in determining whether the person convicted of a felony
is disqualified as a witness ....
104. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
105. Id. at 602 (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 602-04.
107. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, supra note 10.
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most of the current laws must be curtailed. Presently, unless there is
an intervention of executive clemency, a felon is frequently deprived
of the right to vote for the rest of his life.
To curb that indefiniteness, the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice has suggested °8 that the
states adopt the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code § 306.3
which states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person who is convicted of a crime
shall be disqualified
(1) from voting in a primary or election if and only so long as he is committed
under a sentence of imprisonment and
(2) from serving as a juror until he has satisfied his sentence. 1 09
The Model Penal Code has foresaken traditional negative "punish-
ment" theory in correction and directed itself, instead, to the affir-
mative goal of rehabilitation. "The rehabilitative potential of per-
mitting voting [even in the prison system itself], by at least those
inmates convicted of crimes not involving dishonesty [or election
fraud] has been recognized."' 10 Since almost all state legislatures
have frequently committed themselves to the ideal of rehabilitation
as a desirable goal for our prison systems, the type of laws under
attack herein are not only unreasonably broad in light of the specific
purpose of the challenged laws, but, also, are in direct conflict with
the states' commitment to rehabilitating these individuals and making
them a meaningful part of the American scheme.
Lifetime deprivations of the vote are especially repugnant when
one realizes that the vast majority of first time felons are in their early
twenties and that the average age for all felons is considerably under
30."' The openendedness of the deprivation of the vote means that
the youthful offender is assumed to be "corrupt" decades after his of-
fense. Thus, any reasonable connection between the committed
felony and the individual's potential for harming the election process
may well have long since disappeared, yet the individual continues
in a state of deprived citizenship. One has only to look to the stat-
108. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS Ch. 8 (1967).
109. MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.3 (1961).
110. BASS, PRISONERS AND Ex CONVICTS 6-7 (A paper presented June 20-24,
1968, at the A.C.L.U. Biennial Conference, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor).
111. GLEASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 460-75
1964).
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utes and constitutions of sixteen states discussed above to realize
that an indeterminate deprivation of the vote is not necessary to
achieve the desired goal and is too inclusive to meet any fourteenth
amendment attacks.
The offensively broad sweep of the law can be corrected by nar-
rowly drawn statutes and specific time limitations on deprivations.
Even if-as seems unlikely-this should place an administrative
burden on the states in determining which felons actually stand in a
position of rational relationship to the purpose of such laws, this is
not a ground for unjustly depriving individuals of their vote:
We deal here with matters close to the core of our constitutional system. "The right
. . . to choose," ... that this Court has been so zealous to protect, means at least,
that states may not casually deprive a class of individuals of the vote because of some
remote administrative benefit to the state. 112
THE CHALLENGED PRACTICE DEPRIVES THE EX-CONVICTS OF
RIGHTS OF NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP
As long as ours is a representative form of government and our legislatures are
those instruments of government elected by and directly representative of the peo-
ple, the right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of
our political system.""
But representative government is in essence self-government through the medium of
elected representatives of the people, and each and every citizen has an inalien-
able right to full and effective participation in the political processes of his State's
legislative bodies. Most citizens can achieve this participation only as qualified voters
through the election of legislators to represent them.11 4 To the extent that a citizen's
right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen. 115
But does the phrase "qualified voters" make the right beyond the
grasp of felons? Certainly not. As Chief Justice Warren said in
Trop v. Dulles:
Citizenship is not a license that expires upon misbehavior . . . . And deprivation
of citizenship is not a weapon that the Government may use to express its dis-
pleasure at a citizen's conduct, however reprehensible that conduct may be. 116
Few activities more symbolically involve a citizen in the process of a
democratic government than the action of voting. 1 7 Now, in light of
recent case law, it is understood that "political discussion," which is
112. Carrington v. Rash, supra note 22, at 96.
113. Reynolds v. Sims, 337 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
114. Id. at 565 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 567.
116. 356 U.S. 86, 92-93 (1958).
117. Supra note 110, at 6.
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a right of citizenship, is an ineffective right under the first amendment
"if its ultimate objective can be denied at the ballot box.""" In other
words, when the right to vote is subtracted from citizenship, you are
left with something less than full citizenship. This is in startling con-
trast with the absolute terms with which citizenship is usually de-
scribed." 9  And that "liberty" which each citizen has as an "inalien-
able right" is "[l]iberty under law [which] extends to the full range of
conduct which the individual is free to pursue."'12  To curtail the
liberty of a group of citizens because of a presumption of their "cor-
ruption" is to reduce their citizenship into something inferior to that
enjoyed by others.
Once acquired, this Fourteenth Amendment citizenship was not to be shifted, can-
celled, or deleted at the will of the Federal Government, the States, or any other
government unit.
1 21
In short, the action of a state in denying the vote to citizens of the
United States amounts to a state-created "second-class citizenship. 1
22
This country cannot tolerate gradations of citizenship!
In a very recent case, the federal court in Maryland was asked to
consider the voteless state of individuals living in a federal enclave.
The opinion harkens back to the basis of the American Revolution.
This country was founded on the idea that taxation without repre-
sentation was intolerable.
We conclude that on balance the plaintiffs here are treated by the State of Mary-
land as State residents to such an extent that it is a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment for the State to deny them the right to vote. 123
Perhaps it is a simplistic view, but under current law in half the
states of the union, convicted felons are taxed while being deprived
of the opportunity of participating in representative government.
THE CHALLENGED PRACTICES AMOUNT TO A RESTRAINT ON THE FREE-
DOM OF MOVEMENT PROTECTED BY THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES,
CITIZENSHIP AND DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION
If one wonders whether the deprivation of freedom of movement
118. Supra note 27, at 249.
119. Supra note 81, at 873.
120. Bolling v. Sharpe, supra note 82, at 498 (1954).
121. Afroyin v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 262 (1967) (emphasis added).
122. Schneider v. Rusk, supra note 82.
123. Cornman v. Dawson, 295 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1969).
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is an actual threat under such laws, he has only to refer to the laws
of the sixteen states enumerated above. Citizens of those states
whose right to vote becomes automatically restored upon completion
of sentence, or after a given term of years, or who committed a felony
which would not disqualify them from voting in the convicting state
but which is grounds for disfranchisement under the law of a state to
which they wish to move, will plainly be reluctant to come into a
state where they cannot exercise their full citizenship. If freedom of
movement is a constitutionally protected right 124 and the state dis-
qualifying law has the potential of exercising a "chilling effect"'
121
upon that right through the discouragement of interstate travel'2 6 for
the purpose of establishing a residence 127 and of voting, the state
law must fall. Thus, a three judge federal district court in Con-
necticut said:
Further support for the proposition that the right of interstate travel also encom-
passes that right to be free of discouragement of interstate movement may be found
by analogy to cases proscribing actions which have a chilling effect on First Amend-
ment rights.128
As a three judge federal district court in Kentucky said in consider-
ing the constitutionality of that state's vagrancy statute: "Move-
ment is essential to freedom .... "1129 The court felt that such move-
ment was a "basic right of citizenship.""' The Supreme Court, too,
has observed that the "right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which
"1131the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law ....
Thus, suppression of the right to vote would be an indirect method
of denying one's liberty, which is not allowed. 1 2
Even if one wrongly views the right to vote in the most archaic
light-that is, as a gratuitous privilege granted by the states-it can-
not be denied because an individual moved to another state. Deny-
124. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 183 (1941) (Jackson J., concurring).
125. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
126. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
127. Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331, 336 (D. Conn. 1967) (3 judge
court), aJJ'd, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
128. Id. at 336. See also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Aptheker v. Sec-
retary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 127 (1958);
and Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
129. Baker v. Bindner, 274 F. Supp. 658, 662 (W.D. Ky. 1967) (3 judge court).
130. Id.
131. United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967).
132. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540 (1965).
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ing even a gratuitous benefit because of the exercise of a constitu-
tionally protected right effectively impedes the exercise of that
right. 133
PRESENT STATE METHODS FOR RESTORATION OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE
THROUGH AN EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY VIOLATE
THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
In the initial portion of this article, state laws which prohibit all
felons from voting were contested. However, most of these states
do not simply take the vote from the felons; they disfranchise only
convicted felons whose civil rights have not been restored. We
shall summarily consider the attack against laws that give the right to
vote to some convicted felons while withholding it from others.
Typical of such laws is the Florida statute which provides that:
The following persons are not entitled to vote: ...
(d) Persons convicted of any felony by any court of record and whose civil rights
have not been restored."34
It does not necessarily follow that if the voting right of a convicted
felon may be constitutionally forfeited, a state is free of constitu-
tional restraints in establishing the terms on which they may be re-
stored. Nor does it follow that the chief executive of a state is free
of constitutional restraints imposed by the fourteenth amendment.
The due process and equal protection clauses govern any actions of
the state whether through its legislature, its courts, or its executive
or administrative officers." 5
"RESTORATION" LAWS TREAT MEMBERS OF THE
SAME CLASS UNEQUALLY
A state's grant of the right to vote to some felons while with-
holding it from others amounts to a classic equal protection breach.
People in identical circumstances are treated differently. Some peo-
ple are forced by law to forego a constitutionally protected right
133. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405-06 (1963).
134. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.041(5)(d) (1965); FLA. CONsT. art. VI, § 4. See
FLA. CONST. ART. IV, § 8(a) (1969), which allows the Governor to restore civil
rights with the approval of his cabinet.
135. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). See also Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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that others in like circumstances are allowed to exercise.
The United States Supreme Court has spoken on this issue many
times:
When the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the
same quality of offense ...it has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had
selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment.136
And, in another case, more nearly on point:
Our cases demonstrate that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment restrains the states from fixing voter qualifications which invidiously discrimi-
nate.' 3 7
Even if one is not convinced by the authors' first argument and
finds that a state can take away the vote of a felon, the procedure
of giving the vote to some felons and not to others cannot stand.
"[O]nce the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be
drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." '
A GOVERNOR'S ABILITY TO GIVE THE VOTE TO SOME CONVICTED
FELONS AT HIS DISCRETION VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION
There are no standards or regulations governing the restoration of
civil rights in most states. Applicants to have their civil rights re-
stored have no way of knowing whether they will be "qualified";
such a law is "susceptible of sweeping and improper application."1"9
The governor has the power to deny the applicant because of his
race, religion, sex, or for any other reason that he desires; whether
these reasons are related to the applicant's ability to cast a ballot is
immaterial under the present restoration statutes. Frequently, the
only restriction placed on this power is in cases of treason and im-
peachment, in which cases civil rights may not be restored. This
process impermissibly "license[s] the jury [authority] to create its
own standards in each case."140 In the case of Thompson v.
Shapiro, 4' the court held, inter alia, that where government con-
136. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
137. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, supra note 10, at 666.
138. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, supra note 10, at 665.
139. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
140. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 263 (1937).
141. 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967) (3 judge court), prob. juris. noted, 389
U.S. 1032 (1968), alj'd, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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fers advantages on some, it must, in order not to deny equal pro-
tection, justify its denial to others by reference to a constitutionally
recognized reason.'
Especially relevant to our inquiry is the case of United States v.
Penton.'43 The Attorney General of the United States sued to enjoin
state officials from practices depriving citizens of the United States
of the right to register and vote because of their race. The court
held that the right to vote is a "personal right" that is vested in
qualified individuals "by virtue of their citizenship. [It is] not a
privilege to be granted or denied at the whim or caprice of state
officers or state governments."'44
The law is clear that unfettered discretion on the part of the state,
whether in the hands of the legislature, the governor, or state agen-
cies, is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. For example,
in Cox v. Louisiana,'45 the city's and state's unfettered discretion
in granting permits for meetings was held to be unconstitutional.
The Cox decision was reaffirmed in the recent case of Shuttlesworth
v. City of Birmingham.'46 One of the most obvious reasons for the
policy which disfavors overbroad criminal sanctions is that they
allow impermissible room for subjective judgments on the part of the
authorities. The laws providing for restoration of civil rights such as
voting could be used for "harsh and discriminatory enforcement
by . . . officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their
displeasure .. "147
An analogous issue was before the United States Supreme Court
in Louisiana v. United States.48  Louisiana had a voters' "interpre-
tation test" in which new registrants had to interpret sections of the
Louisiana and federal Constitutions. The state admitted that the
statutes establishing the interpretation test vested discretion in the
registrars of voters to determine the qualifications of applicants for
142. See also Sherbert v. Verner, supra note 133. In the Thompson case, the
State of Connecticut was found to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
because it gave welfare to some and not to others similarly situated based on
unreasonable regulations.
143. 212 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ala. 1962).
144. Id. at 202 (emphasis added).
145. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
146. 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965).
147. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 18, 97-98 (1940).
148. 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
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registration while imposing no definite and objective standards upon
the registrars for the administration of the test. Justice Black, ex-
pressing the views of eight members of the Court, said:
The cherished right of people in a country like ours to vote cannot be obliterated
by the use of laws like this, which leave the voting fate of a citizen to the passing
whim or impulse of an individual registrar. Many of our cases have pointed out
the invalidity of laws so completely devoid of standards and restraints.1 4 9
The logic of Louisiana v. United States is highly persuasive in the
"restoration" context. A governor is like the Louisiana registrar in
that application is made to him and he decides at his "whim or im-
pulse" who may vote. It does not matter what label is used-par-
don, restoration of civil rights, or whatever-the felon must apply to
the governor and he may allow the applicant to vote. The four-
teenth amendment's equal protection requirements are not met by this
procedure.
THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH CONVICTED FELONS ARE GIVEN THE RIGHT
TO VOTE IN MOST STATES VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT BECAUSE IT IS SO VAGUE AND STANDARD-
LESS THAT IT LEAVES APPLICANTS UNCERTAIN AS TO NECESSARY CON-
DUCT AND REQUIREMENTS TO HAVE THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS RESTORED
As Mr. Justice Douglas has said:
It is not without significance that most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights are
procedural. It is procedure that spells much of the difference between the rule by
law and rule by whim or caprice. Steadfast adherence to strict procedural safe-
guards is our main assurance that there will be equal justice under law.150
That the due process clauses will strike down procedures that are
so vague and standardless that they leave the public uncertain as to
conduct which is prohibited or required, is a proposition that our
courts have long recognized.' 51 This is especially true when funda-
mental rights are involved. The right to vote is such a right, 152 and,
as such, it is protected by the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth
amendment against any state deprivation which does not meet the
standards of due process. This protection is not to be avoided by the
simple label which a state may choose to fasten upon its conduct or
149. Id. at 153.
150. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179
(1951).
151. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
152. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 113.
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its statute.'53 The states have often chosen to call the restoration of
the right to vote an exercise of the pardon power-thus, an act of
mercy. By bringing the voting disfranchisement under the pardon
umbrella, the states have claimed absolute executive discretion on
behalf of the pardoning body and have avoided judicial review-
quite an example of semantical gamesmanship. The statutes or regu-
lations which connect the restoration of the vote with pardon power
are usually most indirect. Usually, there is an election regulation,
statute or oath which removes the convicted felon from the "quali-
fied voter" category until his civil rights are restored. Thus, the
basic problem is an election regulation; the pardon power comes into
it only as the avenue for qualifying under the election regulation.
A state cannot take a regulatory statute, and, by linking it with the
governor's clemency power, waive all constitutional restraints. The
contention that the restoration of the right to vote is part and parcel
of the pardon power, no different from the authority to commute a
death sentence to life, cannot stand. When a person is sent to prison
as punishment for a crime, the granting of a pardon as an act of
mercy has traditionally been beyond judicial review. However, when
the executive administers regulatory statutes, his actions have his-
torically been within the purview of judicial review."'
CONCLUSION
It must be emphasized that the entire issue of deprivation of a
felon's voting rights should be seen in the context of suffrage as it has
emerged in recent years. Congress and the courts have constantly
expanded the right to vote, even to the point of making it possible for
nonresidents to participate in presidential elections. The laws at-
tacked herein are remnants of feudalism and the "punishment"
psychology of an earlier age.
It has been argued that the disfranchisement of felons is justified
by section two of the fourteenth amendment. Disregarding for the
moment whatever meaning "treason or other crime" may have
possessed historically, it is not conceivable that today "other crime"
can possibly be read as any other crime. Could the lifetime depri-
vation of suffrage of the one-time vagrant or careless driver or oper-
153. Supra note 151, at 401.
154. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925).
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ator of a car without a muffler be tolerated? Rather than such an
all-encompassing interpretation of section two, it is contended that
section two must be read with the rest of the fourteenth amendment
so that a state has the power to disfranchise those whose deprivation
meets the equal protection, due process and citizenship tests dis-
cussed in this article. In other words, section two only allows dis-
franchisement of persons who have committed a crime that would
rationally be related to the corruption of the electoral system. 15
This article has portrayed the right to vote as it has evolved-a
fundamental right protected by the Constitution. When one con-
siders the poor voting turnout in this country, the discouragement of
any class of persons who wish to vote is tragic. Our task is to make
it easier for people to vote, not harder. As President John F. Ken-
nedy once said, rather prophetically: "It is easier today to buy a
destructive weapon, a gun in a hardware store than it is to vote ...
Why make it difficult for people to vote?"' 56
155. See RUTGERS L. REV. supra note 17, at 136-40 and accompanying text.
156. 114 Cong. Rec. H.8079, H.8077 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1968) (remarks of
Representative Schwengel).
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